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Abstract 
A key economic issue is whether poor countries or regions tend to grow faster than 
rich ones: are there automatic forces that lead to convergence over time in the levels of per 
capita income and product? We use the neoclassical growth model as a framework to study 
convergence across the 48 contiguous U.S. states. We exploit data on personal income 
since 1840 and on gross state product since 1963. The U.S. states provide clear evidence of 
convergence, but the findings can be reconciled quantitatively with the neoclassical model 
only if diminishing returns to capital set in very slowly. The results for per capita GDP 
from a broad sample of countries are similar if we hold constant a set of variables that 
proxy for differences in steady-state characteristics. 
A key economic issue is whether poor countries or regions tend to grow faster than 
rich ones: are there automatic forces that lead to convergence over time in the levels of per 
capita income and product? We use the neoclassical growth model as a framework to study 
convergence across the 48 contiguous U.S. states. We exploit data on personal income 
since 1840 and on gross state product since 1963. For studying the determinants of 
economic growth, the experience of the U.S. states represents a vastly underutilized 
resource: in effect, we have over a century of data on 48 economies (although surely not 48 
closed economies!). 
The U.S. states provide clear evidence of convergence in the sense of poor economies 
tending to grow faster than rich ones in per capita terms. The estimated speed of 
convergence accords with the neoclassical growth model if we take a broad view of capital 
so that diminishing returns to capital set in slowly as an economy develops. The findings 
for the U.S. states can be reconciled with those for a broad cross-section of countries if we 
allow for a notion of conditional convergence in the underlying growth model. Some 
puzzles arise, however, in reconciling the data with open-€conomy extensions of the model. 
In particular, the rates of convergence found for income and product across the U.S. states 
are similar, whereas theoretical reasoning suggests some important differences. 
Convergence in the Neoclassical Growth Model 
In neoclassical growth models for closed economies, as presented by Ramsey (1928), 
Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), the per capita growth rate tends to be 
inversely related to the starting level of output or income per person. In particular, if 
economies are similar in respect to preferences and technology, then poor economies grow 
faster than rich ones. Thus, there is a force that promotes convergence in levels of per 
capita product and income. Since the model is familiar, we provide only a brief sketch. 
2 
The production function in intensive form is 
A A 
y = f(k) 
where; and kare output and capital per unit of effective labor, Lext, Lis labor (and 
population), and xis the rate of exogenous, labor-augmenting technological progress. (We 
assume the usual curvature properties for the production function.) In a closed economy, k 
evolves as 
A A A A 
(2) k = f(k) - c - ( o+x+n)k 
where ~ = C /Lext, ois the rate of depreciation, and n is the growth rate of L. The 
representative, infinite-horizon household maximizes utility, 
(3) 
where c = C/L, pis the rate of time preference, and 
(4) u(c) = (c1- 0-1)/(1-0) 
with 0>0, so that marginal utility, u'(c), has the constant elasticity -0 with respect to c. 
(We assume p>n+(l-0)x in the following to satisfy the transversality condition.) 
The first-order condition for maximizing U in equation (3) entails 
• A 
(5) c/c = (1/ 0) •[f'(k) - o- p] 
3 
In the steady state, the effective quantities, y, k, and c, do not change and the per capita 
quantities, y, k, and c grow at the rate x. The level of k in the steady state satisfies 
A
(6) f1(k*) = o+ p + Ox 
A A
If the economy starts with k below k*, then the usual analysis shows that k 
A 
A
monotonically approaches k* (see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer [1989, Ch. 2]). We 
have shown (Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991b, Ch. I]) that the growth rate of capital per 
worker, k/k, declines monotonically toward the steady-state value, x. This property 
carries over unambiguously to the growth rate of output per worker, y/y, if the production 
function is Cobb-Douglas; that is, if 
(7) ; = f(k) = Ak 0 
where O<o:<l. Thus, if two economies have the same parameters of preferences and 
technology, then the key result is that the initially poorer economy-with a lower starting 
value of k-tends to grow faster in per capita terms. 
The transitional dynamics can be quantified by using a log-linearization of equations 
A
(2) and (5) around the steady state. The solution for log[y(t)] in the log-linearized 
approximation to the model with a Cobb-Douglas technology is 
where the positive parameter /3, which governs the speed of adjustment to the steady state, 
is given by the formula 
4 
where 1/J = p-n-(1-0)x>0. 
The average growth rate of y over the interval between dates 0 and T is 
(1 -/JT) [ A A ](10) (1/T)•log[y(T)/y(0)] = x + - - log[y*/y(0)]1 
The higher /3 the greater the responsiveness of the average growth rate to the gap between 
A A 
log(y*) and log[y(0)]; that is, the more rapid the convergence to the steady state. The 
model implies conditional convergence in that, for given x and y*, the growth rate is higher 
A A 
the lower y(0). The convergence is conditional in that y(0) enters in relation to y* and x, 
which may differ across economies. In cross-country regressions, it is crucial, but difficult, 
to hold fixed the variations in y* and x in order to estimate {3. One advantage of the U.S. 
state context is that the differences in y* and x are likely to be minor, so that conditional 
and absolute convergence need not be distinguished. 
Because the crucial element for convergence in the neoclassical model is diminishing 
returns to capital, the extent of this diminishing returns-that is, the size of the 
capital-share coefficient a in equation (7)-has a strong effect on /3. To assess the relation 
quantitatively we use a set of baseline values for the other parameters: p=0.05 per year, 
6=0.05 per year, n=0.02 per year, x=0.02 per year, and 8=1 (log utility). The value 
n=0.02 per year is the average of population growth for the United States over the long 
history. The other baseline parameters come from estimates reported in Jorgenson and 
Yun (1986, 1990). If we assume a=0.35-a capital share appropriate to a narrow concept 
of physical capital (see, for example, Maddison [1987])-then equation (9) implies /3=0.126 
per year, which corresponds to a half-life for the log of output per effective worker of 5.5 
years. For a=0.80, which might apply if capital is interpreted broadly to include human 
5 
capital, the value .6=0.026 per year implies a half-life of 27 years. As a approaches unity, 
diminishing returns to capital disappear, .6 tends to zero, and the half-life tends to infinity. 
The effects of the other parameters have been explored by Chamley (1981) and King 
and Rebelo (1989).1 Quantitatively, the most important effect is that a lower 0 (increased 
willingness to substitute intertemporally) raises /3. Another result is that the parameter A 
in equation (7) does not affect /3. Thus, the convergence coefficient f3 can be similar across 
economies that differ greatly in levels of per capita product because of differences in the 
available technique ( or in government policies or natural resources that amount to 
differences in the parameter A). 
The main result for the subsequent analysis is that the baseline 
specification-including a=0.35-generates a short half-life and a rapid speed of 
adjustment. The speeds of adjustment that we estimate empirically are much slower: /3 is 
in the neighborhood of 0.02 per year. The theory conforms to the empirical findings only if 
we assume parameter values that depart substantially from the baseline case. One 
possibility is a value of a around 0.8; that is, in the range in which the broad nature of 
capital implies that diminishing returns set in slowly. We can reduce the required value of 
a to around 0.5 if we assume very high values of 0 (in excess of ten) and a value of oclose 
to zero. 
Setup of the Empirical Analysis 
Consider a version of equation (10) that applies for discrete periods to economy i and 
is augmented to include a random disturbance: 
/3 A*
where ai=xi+(l-€- )log(y i) and uit is a disturbance term. Although the coefficient /3 can 
6 
vary across economies, we neglect these differences in our analysis. This assumption is 
tenable for the U.S. states, which are likely to be similar in terms of the underlying 
parameters of technology and preferences. Also, as mentioned before, the theory implies 
that pure differences in the level of technology do not affect /3. Thus, /3 can be similar for 
economies that are very different in other respects. 
In the application to the U.S. states, we assume that the coefficient ai in equation
A*(11) is the same for all i; that is, we assume that the steady-state value, yi' and the rate of 
technological progress, x., do not differ across states. The time trend, x. •(t-1 ), is then also1 1 
the same for all i. The conditions ai=a and xi=x in equation (11) imply that poor 
economies tend to grow unconditionally faster that rich ones if /3>0. Because the 
coefficient on log(yi t-l) is (1-e-/3), which is between zero and one, the convergence is not
'
strong enough to eliminate the positive serial correlation in log(yit). Put alternatively, in 
the absence of random shocks, convergence to the steady state is direct and involves no 
oscillations. This property reflects the absence of overshooting in the neoclassical growth 
model. 
Convergence in the sense of poor economies tending to grow faster than rich ones, 
which corresponds to /3>0 if ai and xi are the same for all i in equation (11), does not 
necessarily imply that the cross-economy dispersion of log(yit) declines over time. The 
effect from /3>0, which tends to reduce dispersion, is offset by random shocks, uit' which 
tend to raise dispersion. If uit has zero mean, variance u~, and is distributed 
independently over time and across economies, then the cross-economy variance of 




(We assume here that the cross section is large enough so that the sample variance of 
log(yit) corresponds to the population variance, u~.) Equation (13) implies that u~ 
monotonically approaches the steady-state value, u2 = u~/(1-e-217), which rises with u~ 
but declines with P, The variance u~ falls (or rises) over time if the initial value u~ is 
greater than (or less than) u2. Thus, a positive coefficient Pdoes not ensure a falling u~. 
Shocks that have common influences on sub-groups of countries or regions, such as 
harvest failures and oil shocks, imply that uit in equation (11) would not be independent of 
ujt for j:/i. An important example of this kind of shock from the U.S. history is the Civil 
War, which had a strong adverse effect on the southern states relative to the northern 
states. We can handle this type of situation by writing the error term, uit' in equation (11) 
as the sum of an aggregate influence and an independent disturbance: 
where st is an aggregate shock, which has zero mean and variance u;, and ¢\ measures the 
effect of the aggregate disturbance on the growth rate of economy i. We assume that, with 
<PjSt held constant, the error term, vit' is cross-sectionally and serially independent with 
zero mean and constant variance u2.2
V 
We assume that the coefficients </Ji in equation (14) have mean 1, variance u!, and 
are distributed independently of vit' If log(yi t-l) and <pi are uncorrelated, then estimates
'of the coefficient Pin equation (14) would not be systematically related to the realization 
of st because the composite error term, uit = ¢;ist +vit' is uncorrelated with the regressor, 
log(yi,t-l). Suppose, alternatively, that COV[log(yi,t-l), </Ji] > O; for example, if a 
8 
positive st represents an increase in the relative price of oil, then economies that produce a 
lot of oil (¢i>7p) tend to have high values of Yi,t-l' In this case, the least-squares 
estimate of the coefficient on log(yi t-l) in equation (14) is biased for a given realization of
' . 
st. For example, if oil-producing economies have relatively high values of Yi,t-l' then 
least-squares procedures tend to underestimate /3 for a period in which the oil price rises.3 
In the empirical analysis, we include variables that we think hold constant the effects 
of aggregate shocks, st, on economy i1s growth rate. One reason to add these variables is to· 
achieve cross-sectional independence of the error terms, vit' in equation (14): the 
composite error, uit = ¢ist+vit' would not exhibit this independence. The second purpose 
is to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficient /3, conditional on the realizations of st. 
The Data for the U.S. States 
We have two measures of per capita income or product across the U.S. states. The 
first is per capita personal income. The U.S. Commerce Department has published annual 
data on nominal personal income for the 48 continental states since 1929 (see Bureau of 
Economic Analysis [1986] and recent issues of U.S. Survey of Current Business). We use 
the figures that exclude transfer payments from all levels of government. Easterlin 
(1960a,b) provides estimates of state personal income for 1840 (29 states or territories), 
1880 (47 states or territories), 1900 (48 states or territories), and 1920 (48 states). These 
data also exclude transfer payments. 
We lack useful measures of price levels or price indexes for individual states. 
Therefore, we deflate the nominal values for each state by the national index for consumer 
prices. Since we use the same price deflator for each state in a single year, the particular 
deflator that we use affects only the constant terms in the subsequent regressions. The use 
of the same deflator for each state introduces two types of potential measurement error. 
First, if relative purchasing-power parity does not hold across the states, then the growth 
9 
rates of real per capita income are mismeasured. Second, if absolute purchasing power 
parity does not hold, then the levels of real per capita income are mismeasured. 
The second type of data is per capita gross state product (GSP), which is available 
annually for each state from 1963 to 1986 (see Renshaw, Trott and Friedenberg [1988]). 
This variable, which is analogous to gross domestic product, measures factor incomes 
derived from production within a state. We deflate the nominal figures by the aggregate 
gross state product deflator for the year. (This deflator is close to that for U.S. gross 
domestic product.) Since we use a common deflator for each state at a point in time, the 
particular deflator chosen is again of no consequence. We should stress, however, that the 
GSP figures that we use are not quantity indexes, but rather represent the incomes 
accruing to factors from the goods and services produced within a state. 
The main differences between state personal income and gross state product involve 
capital income. Personal income includes corporate net income only when individuals 
receive payment as dividends, whereas GSP includes corporate profits and depreciation. 
(Neither concept includes capital gains.) Most importantly, GSP attributes capital income 
to the state in which the business activity occurs, whereas personal income attributes it to 
the state of the asset holder. 4 
Evidence on Convergence for the U.S. States 
We use the data on real per capita income or product, yit' for a cross section of the 
U.S. states, i = 1, ... , N. Equations (10) and (11) imply that the average growth rate over 
the interval between any two points in time, t0 and t +T, is given by0 
(15) 
where ui,to,to+T is a distributed lag of the error terms, uit' between dates t0 and t0+T. 
5 
{ff A*
The constant term is B = x + [(1-e- )/T] •[log(y )+xt0], which is independent of i A* A* 
because we assumed y i = y and xi = x. The coefficient B shifts because of the trend in 
technology with a change in the starting date, t0. 
The coefficient on log(y. t ) in equation (15) is ~(1-e-{ff)/T, which declines in 
1, 0 
magnitude with the length of the interval, T, for a given {3. As T gets larger, the effect of 
the initial position on the average growth rate gets smaller; as T tends to infinity, the 
coefficient tends to zero. We estimate {3 non-linearly to take account of the associated 
value of Tin the form of equation (15). Therefore, we should obtain similar estimates of {3 
regardless of the length of the interval. 
Table 1 contains non-linear least-squares regressions in the form of equation (15) for 
the U.S. states or territories and for various time periods. 6 Aside from log(y. t ), each 
1, Q 
regression includes a constant and three regional dummy variables: south, midwest, west. 
(To save space, the estimated coefficients for the constant and the regional dummies are 
not shown in the table.) Because the regional dummies are held constant, the effect of 
initial per capita income does not reflect purely regional differences, such as the southern 
states catching up with the northern states. 7 
For the longest interval, 1880-1988 (for 47 observations), the estimated convergence 
coefficient shown in line 1 of Table 2 is {3 = 0.0175 (s.e. = 0.0046). Figure 1 shows the 
dramatic inverse relation between the average growth rate from 1880 to 1988 and 
log(y1880): the simple correlation is -0.93. 
The full time series for yit (1880, 1900, 1920, and annually from 1929) potentially 
provides more information about the coefficient {3. For a smaller value of T, however, the 
error term in equation (15), u. t t +T' represents an average of shocks over a shorter1
' 0' 0 
interval. Therefore, the estimates become more sensitive to the specification of the error 




t t +T and log(y.
1 
t ) is likely to be negligible for large T but
' 0' 0 ' 0 
substantial for small T. For this reason, we have not attempted to use the full annual time 
series that starts in 1929. 
Table 1, lines 2-10, shows estimates of f3 for nine sub-periods of the overall sample: 
1880-1900, 1900-1920, ten-year intervals from 1920 to 1980, and 1980-1988. (There are 
4 7 observations for the first sub-period and 48 for the others.) Each regression includes a 
constant and the three regional dummies. The results show values of f3 that range from 
-0.0122 (0.0074) for 1920-1930 to 0.0373 (0.0053) for 1940-1950. 
If all nine sub-periods are restricted to have a single value for /3, then the estimate is 
f3
A 
= 0.0189 (0.0019) on line 11. This estimation allows each sub-period to have individual 
coefficients for the constant and the regional dummies.a The joint estimate of f3 is close to 
the value, 0.0175, estimated for the single interval 1880-1988. But, as would be expected, 
the standard error from the joint estimation, 0.0019, is a good deal smaller than that, 
0.0046, found for the single interval. The problem with the joint estimate is that the data 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient f3 is the same for the nine sub-periods. The 
likelihood-ratio statistic for this hypothesis, 32.1, is well above the 5% critical value from 
the x2 distribution with 8 df of 15.5 (p-value = 0.000). 
The unstable pattern of f3 coefficients across sub-periods can reflect aggregate 
disturbances that have differential effects on state incomes, as represented by the term ¢ist 
in equation (14). For example, during the 1920s, the ratio of the WPI for farm products to 
the overall CPI fell at an average annual rate of 3.5%. The agricultural states also had 
below-average per capita personal income in 1920; the correlation of log(y1920) with the 
share of national income originating in agriculture in 1920 was -0.67. Thus, the estimated 
coefficient, f3 = -0.0122, for the 1920-1930 period in Table 1 likely reflects the tendency of 
the poorer states to be agricultural and therefore to experience relatively low growth in this 
12 
decade. This effect reverses for the 1940-1950 decade when the ratio of the WPI for farm 
products to the overall CPI grew at an average annual rate of 9.5%. 
To hold constant this type of effect, we construct a variable that measures the 
sectoral composition of income in each state. For the sub-periods that begin since 1930, we 
use a breakdown of the sources of labor income (including income from self employment) 
into nine categories: agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation and 
public utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance-insurance-real estate, services, and 
government and government enterprises. For each sub-period, we construct a 
sectoral-composition variable for state i: 
9 
(16) sit= Lwijt •log(yj,t+T/Yjt)
j=l 
where wijt is the weight of sector j in state i1s personal income at time t and Yjt is the 
national average of personal income that originates in sector j at time t, expressed as a 
ratio to national population at time t. Aside from the effect of changing sectoral weights 
within a state, the variable sit would equal the growth rate of per capita personal income in 
state i between years t and t+T if each of the state's sectors grew at the national average 
rate for that sector. In particular, the variable reflects shocks to agriculture, oil, etc., in a 
way that interacts with state Ps concentration in the sectors that do relatively well or 
badly in terms of income because of the shocks. 
We think of the variable sit as a proxy for common effects related to sectoral 
composition in the error term in equation (15). Note that sit depends on contemporaneous 
realizations of national variables, but only on lagged values of state variables. Because the 
impact of an individual state on national aggregates is small, sit can be nearly exogenous 
13 
with respect to the current individual error term for state i. In any event, we assume that, 
with sit held constant, the error terms are independent across states and over time. 
For the sub-periods that begin before 1930, we lack detailed data on the sectoral 
composition of personal income, but we have data on the fraction of national income 
originating in agriculture. For these sub-periods, we use this fraction as a measure of sit• 
Note that the different methods of construction and the differing behavior of agricultural 
relative prices mean that the coefficients of the variable sit will vary from one sub-period 
to another. Therefore, we estimate a separate coefficient on sit for each sub-period. 
Lines 12-20 in Table 1 add the variable s.t to the growth-rate regressions for each - 1 
sub-period. (The first su~period has 46 observations and the others have 48.) As before, 
these regressions include log(y. t ), a constant, and three regional dummies. Not 
1, 0 
surprisingly, the estimated coefficients on the variable sit for the post-1930 su~periods 
are typically positive. That is, states in which income originates predominantly in sectors 
that do well at the national level tend to have higher per capita growth rates. (The 
estimated coefficient for the 1940-1950 sub-period is negative, but not significantly so.) 
For the sub-periods that begin before 1930, the negative estimated coefficient on sit 
signifies that, holding constant initial per capita income and region, agricultural states 
have lower per capita growth rates. This pattern is especially clear for the agricultural 
price collapse in the 1920-1930 decade: the estimated coefficient on sit is --0.0936 (0.0175). 
For our purposes, the principal finding from the addition of the sectoral-composition 
variables is that the estimated /3 coefficients become much more stable across sub-periods. 
The range is now 0.0139 (0.0076) for 1970-1980 to 0.0362 (0.0055) for 1940-1950. Line 21 
shows that the jointly estimated coefficient for the nine sub-periods is 0.0249 (0.0021 ). 
(This joint estimation allows each sub-period to have individual coefficients for sit' as well 
as for the constant and the regional dummies.) The likelihood-ratio statistic for the 
equality of P-coefficients across the nine sub-periods is now 13.9, compared to the 5% 
14 
critical value of 15.5. Thus, if we hold constant the measures of sectoral composition, we 
no longer reject the hypothesis of a single /3 coefficient at the 5% level (p-value = 0.084). 
The agriculture-share variable, which was included to measure sit for the earlier 
sub-periods in Table 1 (lines 12-14 and the joint estimate on line 21), holds constant 
compositional effects on aggregate state income that reflect shifts of persons out of 
agriculture and into higher productivity jobs in industry and services. If we add the 
agriculture-share variable to the later sub-periods, then the joint estimate for nine 
sub-periods becomes /3
A 
= 0.0224 (0.0022), slightly less than the value shown on line 21. 
This estimate of /3 is virtually unchanged if we include the change in the agriculture share 
over each sub-period in the regressions. Thus, convergence at a rate of about 2% per year 
is net of effects from changes in agricultural shares. 
In general, industry-mix effects would matter for the results if changes in income 
shares among sectors with different average levels of productivity are correlated with initial 
levels of per capita income. It is unclear that we would want to filter out all of these 
effects to measure convergence, but, in any event, our examination of productivity data 
from the post-World War II period indicates that shifts between agriculture and non­
agriculture would be the main effect of this type. Since we already held constant the 
compositional effect for agriculture, it is unlikely that industry-mix effects are a major 
element in the estimated convergence for state personal income. 
The final result from Table 1 is a regression with the 29 available observations from 
1840 to 1880. 9 This regression includes a constant and two regional dummies (no western 
states are in the sample). We exclude the variable sit because the data are unavailable. 
The estimate on line 22 is /3 = 0.0254 (0.0067), which accords with the estimate of 0.0249 
(0.0021) for the sub-periods that begin after 1880 (line 21). 
Figure 2 plots the per capita growth rate from 1840 to 1880 against log(y1840). A 
remarkable aspect of the plot is the separation of the southern and non-southern states 
15 
because of the Civil War. In 1840, the southern and non-southern states differed little in 
terms of average per capita income: the (unweighted) southern average was 94% of the 
non-southern. But in 1880 a wide gap had appeared and the southern average was only 
50% of the non-southern. The figure shows, however, that convergence applies to the 
southern and non-southern states as separate groups. That is, holding constant the 
regional dummies (which effectively hold constant the impact of the Civil War), there is a 
strong negative correlation between the per capita growth rate and the initial level of per 
capita income. 
The Civil War affected states differentially, but, unlike the shock to agriculture in 
the 1920s, the effect of the Civil War on state per capita income had little correlation with 
the initial level of per capita income. For this reason, we do not get a very different point 
estimate of f3 for the 1840-1880 su~period if we eliminate the regional dummies: the 
estimate without these dummies is p= 0.0203 (0.0126). The fall in the R2 of the 
regression from 0.91 in line 22 of Table 1 to 0.19 indicates, however, that the regional 
dummies have a lot of explanatory power in this period! 
Results with Gross State Product 
Table 2 and Figure 3 deal with the growth of per capita gross state product (GSP) for 
48 states over the period 1963-1986. Recall that the data are nominal GSP divided by an 
aggregate, national price deflator. The growth rates therefore pick up changes in relative 
prices that interact with a state1s composition of production. However, the structural 
variable, sit' holds constant these effects from changes in relative prices. 
For the full sample, 1963-1986, the estimated convergence coefficient on line 1 of 
Table 2 is f3 = 0.0180 (0.0059). This regression includes a constant and the three regional 
dummy variables, but no measures of sectoral composition. The regressions over 
sub-periods (1963-1969, 1969-1975, 1975-1981, 1981-1986 on lines 2-5) show marked 
16 
instability in /3: the range is from -0.0285 in 1975-1981 to 0.1130 in 1981-1986. The joint 
estimate of fl for the four sub-periods (line 6) is 0.0211 (0.0053), but the hypothesis of 
equal coefficients is rejected (p-value = 0.000). 
We again add a measure of sectoral composition, sit' analogous to that defined in 
equation (16). The difference is that the data allow us to disaggregate into 54 sectors for 
the origination of GSP. Lines 7-10 in Table 2 show that the /3 coefficients are similar 
across the sub-periods when the variable sit is held constant. The joint estimate on line 11 
is /3 = 0.0216 (0.0042) and the hypothesis of stability across the four sub-periods is 
accepted at the 5% level (p-value = 0.64). 
Some of the instability in the /3 coefficients with the GSP data relate to the 
rp.ovements in oil prices. Oil prices and hence, the incomes of oil states rose substantially 
during the sub-period 1975-1981. Moreover, the oil states were already relatively high in 
per capita GSP by 1975: the correlation of per capita GSP with the share of GSP 
originating in crude oil and natural gas was 0.4. The tendency of the rich oil states to grow 
at relatively high rates upsets the usual convergence pattern and thereby leads to the 
negative value for /3, -0.0285, shown for 1975-1981 in line 4 of Table 2.1° But, when 
sectoral composition is held constant in line 9, the value of {3 for 1975-1981 is similar to 
that found in the other periods. 
For the 1981-1986 period, the key elements are the sharp decline in oil prices and the 
high correlation, 0.7, between per capita GSP and the share of GSP originating in oil and 
natural gas in 1981. The tendency for oil states to do relatively badly in 1981-1986 leads 
to an exaggerated convergence coefficient, fl= 0.1130, in line 5.11 Again, the inclusion of 
the variable sit in line 9 leads to a normal value for {3. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a) disaggregate the non-agricultural part of gross 
state product into value added per worker for eight sectors. The main finding is that 
convergence shows up significantly within these sectors of production, especially for 
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manufacturing. For the non-manufacturing sectors, the overall estimate of {3 is somewhat 
less than 2% per year, whereas for manufacturing the estimate is over 4% per year. The 
main inference from these results is that poorer states grow faster not only in terms of 
overall GSP per person, but also in terms of labor productivity within various sectors of 
production. Thus, as suggested before for personal income, the findings on convergence 
cannot be explained by changes over time in the composition of production. 
Income versus Product 
In a closed~conomy growth model, the convergence properties of income and 
product must coincide. Perhaps surprisingly-because the U.S. states do not look like 
closed economies-the empirical estimates of {3 for personal income are nearly equal to 
those for gross state product. If the estimation for personal income is limited to a similar 
time span to that covered by GSP-namely the three sub-periods, 1960-1970, 1970-1980, 
and 1980-1988-then the joint estimate is (J = 0.0181 (0.0040). Although this point 
estimate is less than that, 0.0216 (0.0042), shown for GSP in Table 2, line 11, the principal 
finding is that the estimates are close. 
The assumptions of a closed economy are implausible for the U.S. states: goods and 
technologies flow across borders, residents of one state can borrow from residents of other 
states, and internal migration is possible. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991b, Ch. 2), we 
extend the neoclassical growth model to allow for internationally tradeable goods and a 
global capital market. These features create a sharp distinction between domestic product 
and income or, equivalently, between domestic capital stock and assets. If technologies are 
the same, then an economy's per capita capital stock and output converge rapidly to those 
prevailing in other economies. In contrast, even if all economies have the same parameters 
of preferences and technologies, per capita incomes do not converge because each small 
economy faces constant returns on the global capital market. Thus, our empirical 
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findings-that rates of convergence are similar for income and product across the U.S. 
states-are puzzling from the perspective of this theory. We offer here some conjectures 
that may help to resolve this puzzle. 
We have modified the analysis along the lines of Cohen and Sachs (1986) to allow for 
a ceiling on the ratio of an economy's external debt to its capital stock. This restriction on 
credit markets is reasonable if the capital stock represents the collateral that secures the 
debt. If we interpret capital broadly to include human capital, then this framework applies 
to the U.S. states if the residents or government of a state cannot borrow nationally to 
finance all of their desired expenditures on education or other forms of investment in 
human capital. The key result from the addition of the borrowing constraint is that 
domestic product behaves eventually like national income. Hence, the convergence 
properties of product and income can be similar, as in our empirical results. 
If technologies (that is, anything represented by the coefficient A in equation [7]) 
differ across economies, then mobility of capital can create divergence of per capita output 
and capital stocks. Economies with higher k tend to have higher values of A and the 
higher A offsets the effect of diminishing returns in the determination of capital's marginal 
product. Therefore, capital (physical or human) may move from poorer to richer 
economies and it is no longer clear theoretically that the convergence coefficient for product 
would exceed that for income. Once we allow for differences in technologies, we also have 
to consider the diffusion of technology across economies, along the lines of Nelson and 
Phelps (1966). The potential to imitate is another reason for poor, follower economies to 
grow at relatively high rates. 
We have extended the neoclassical growth model to allow for migration of persons, 
another force that promotes convergence of per capita product and income across 
economies. Sala-i-Martin (1990, Table 5.2) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a) relate 
net migration for the U.S. states to initial values of per capita personal income over 
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sub-periods of the interval from 1900 to 1987. These studies confirm that net 
in-migration is positively related to initial per capita income. But the results also show 
that the estimated convergence coefficients, /3, are little affected by the inclusion of net 
migration as an explanatory variable in the growth-rate equations. Moreover, we have 
shown that the minor interplay between migration and convergence is quantitatively 
consistent with the neoclassical growth model (extended to allow for migration), given the 
estimated sensitivity of migration to income differentials. 
We leave as an unresolved puzzle the similar estimates for the rates of convergence of 
per capita income and product. We think that a resolution of this puzzle will involve the 
construction of an open-economy growth model that satisfactorily incorporates credit 
markets, factor mobility, and technological diffusion. 
Comparisons with Findings across Countries 
In this section we compare our findings for the U.S. states with analogous results 
across countries. It is well known that growth rates of real per capita GDP are 
uncorrelated with the starting level of real per capita GDP across a large group of countries 
in the post-World War II period. Barro (1991) uses the Summers-Heston (1988) data set 
along with other data to analyze the growth experiences of 98 countries from 1960 to 1985. 
(The limitation to 98 countries, rather than the 114 market economies with Summers­
Heston GDP data from 1960 to 1985, comes from the lack of information on variables other 
than GDP.) Table 3, line 1 shows that a regression for the 98 countries in the form of 
A 
equation (15) leads to the estimate, f3 = --0.0037 (0.0018). The dependent variable is the 
growth rate of real per capita GDP from 1960 to 1985. The only independent variables are 
a constant and the log of 1960 per capita GDP, log(y ). The main finding, also1960 
depicted in Figure 4, is the lack of a close relationship between the growth rate and 
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log(y ).1960 In fact, the convergence coefficient /3 has the wrong sign; that is, there is a 
small tendency for the initially rich countries to grow faster than the poor ones after 1960. 
These cross-country results contrast sharply with the findings discussed earlier for 
the U.S. states. Figures 1 and 3 and Tables 1 and 2 showed that, particularly over the 
longer samples, there is a clear and substantial negative correlation between starting per 
capita income or product and the subsequent growth rate. Line 5 of Table 3 uses a 
specification for the U.S. states that parallels the one used for the countries. The variables 
are based on gross state product over the time period, 1963-1986, and the regression 
includes only log(y1963) and a constant as regressors. The estimate in this case is 
/3 = 0.0218 (0.0053). 
Barro (1991, Table I and Figure II) shows that a significantly negative partial 
relation between the per capita growth rate from 1960 to 1985 and log(y ) emerges for1960 
the 98 countries if some other variables are held constant. The set of other variables in the 
main results consists of primary and secondary school-€nrollment rates in 1960, the average 
ratio of government consumption expenditure (exclusive of defense and education) to GDP 
from 1970 to 1985, proxies for political stability, and a measure of market distortions based 
on purchasing-power-parity ratios for investment goods. If we include these variables for 
the 98 countries in the form of equation (15), then line 2 of Table 3 shows that the 
estimated convergence coefficient becomes /3 = 0.0184 (0.0045). This estimate of /3 is no 
longer very much below the cross-state value shown in line 5 of the table. 
The theoretical relation in equation (15) predicts conditional convergence, that is, a 
negative relation between log(y. t ), and the subsequent growth rate if we hold constant
I, 0 
A* 
the steady-state position, log(y i), and the steady-state growth rate, xi. (The constant B 
A* 
in equation [15] depends on log(y i) and xi.) The theory implies that the relation between 
log(yi t ) and the growth rate will be negative unless the correlation between log(y. t ) and 
' 0 · I, 0
A* 
the two omitted factors, log(y i) and xi' is substantially positive. 
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The U.S. states are likely to be reasonably homogeneous with respect to the steady-
A* 
state values, log(y.) and x.. That is, the differences in initial positions, log(y. t ), may be1 1 1, 0 
relatively much greater. (This condition is especially compelling if the initial differences 
reflect exogenous events, such as wars, world agricultural harvests, and oil shocks.) In this 
case, the negative relation between the growth rate and log(y. t ) would show up even if 
1, 0 
the differences in the steady-state values are not held constant: conditional and absolute 
convergence would coincide. The result for /3 shown in Table 3, line 5 is consistent with 
this perspective. 
In contrast, the sample of 98 countries likely features large differences in the 
A* 
steady-state values, log(yi) and xi; that is, in the underlying parameters of technology and 
preferences ( and natural resources and government policies) that determine these long-run 
values. The absence of substantial labor mobility across countries reinforces the possibility 
of substantial divergences in these steady-state values. The correlation of log(y. t ) with 
1, 0
A* 
log(y i) is likely to be substantially positive; that is, economies with higher steady-state 
values of output per effective worker would have followed a path that led them today to 
higher levels of output per person. Similarly, the correlation of log(y. t ) with x. is likely
I, Q 1 





) could be close to zero, as indicated by the data in Figure 4. (This point is 
made by King and Rebelo [1989, pp 12-13).) On the other hand, if we include additional 
A*
variables that hold constant some of the cross-country variations in log(y i) and xi, then 




) should become more negative. 
We interpret the additional variables that we added to the cross-country regression (Table 
3, line 2) in this manner. Accordingly, we view the estimate of /3 in this regression-which 
is no longer very much below the values from the cross-state regressions-as coming closer 
to the theoretical convergence coefficient. 
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We can evaluate these arguments further by considering a group of relatively 
homogeneous countries, the 20 original members of the OECD. 12 The regression on line 3 
of Table 3 includes only a constant and the log of 1960 per capita GDP. The estimated 
convergence coefficient is fl= 0.0095 (0.0028), which is significant and of the expected sign. 
The magnitude is, however, about half that applicable to the U.S. states (line 5). Our 
interpretation is that the OECD countries are intermediate between the 98--country group 
and the U.S. states in terms of the extent of cross-country variation in steady-state values, 
'* log(y.) and x., relative to the variation in initial positions, log(y. t ). Line 4 of the table 
1 1 1, 0 
shows that the estimate for the OECD countries becomes fl= 0.0203 (0.0068) when the 
additional variables discussed before are added to the regression. This estimate does not 
differ greatly from the comparable value for 98 countries, 0.0184 (0.0045) on line 2. 
We have also explored in a preliminary way the addition of variables as proxies for 
'* the steady-state values, log(y i) and xi, in the cross-state regressions. One variable that 
has a significantly positive influence on the growth rate is the fraction of the work force in 
1960 that had accumulated some amount of college education. 13 We added this variable 
along with the regional dummies and sectoral-composition variable, sit' that we discussed 
before. Table 3, line 6 shows that the estimated convergence coefficient becomes 
fl= 0.0236 (0.0013), compared with 0.0218 (0.0053) on line 5. Thus, the inclusion of these 
other variables has a positive, but minor, effect on the estimate of fl across the U.S. states. 
Overall, the impact of the additional variables on fl is greatest for the 98 countries 
(0.0184 on line 2 versus --0.0037 on line 1), next most important for the 20 OECD countries 
(0.0203 on line 4 versus 0.0095 on line 3), and least important for the 48 U.S. states. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that first, the other variables help to hold constant 
'*cross-sectional differences in the long-run values, log(y.) and x., and second, that the 
1 1 
ranking of the extent of these differences (relative to the differences in log[y. t ]) goes from 
1, 0 
the 98 countries to the 20 OECD countries to the 48 U.S. states. 
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Conclusions 
Our empirical results document the existence of convergence in the sense of 
economies tending to grow faster in per capita terms when they are further below the 
steady-state position. This phenomenon shows up clearly for the U.S. states over various 
periods from 1840 to 1988. Over long samples, poor states tend to grow faster in per capita 
terms than rich states even if we do not hold constant any variables other than initial per 
capita income or product. If we hold constant the region and measures of sectoral 
composition, then the speed of convergence appears to be roughly the same-around 2% 
per year-regardless of the time period or whether we consider personal income or gross 
state product. 
We find evidence of convergence for a sample of 98 countries from 1960 to 1985 only 
in a conditional sense, that is, only if we hold constant variables such as initial 
school-enrollment rates and the ratio of government consumption to GDP. We interpret 
these variables as proxies for the steady-state value of output per effective worker and the 
rate of technological progress. If we hold constant these additional variables, then the 
estimated rates of convergence are only slightly smaller than those found for the U.S. 
states. 
The standard neoclassical growth model with exogenous technological progress and a 
closed economy predicts convergence. To match our quantitative estimates, however, we 
have to assume underlying parameters for preferences and technology that depart 
substantially from usual benchmark cases. In particular, for reasonable values of the other 
parameters, the model requires a capital-share coefficient, a, in the neighborhood of 0.8. 
Lower values of a, which imply that diminishing returns to capital set in more quickly, 
imply a more rapid rate of convergence than that revealed by the data. 
If technologies are the same, then the introduction of a global capital market tends to 
speed up the convergence for output but to slow down the convergence for income. The 
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empirical results for the U.S. states indicate that the speed of convergence for output is 
only slightly faster than that for income. At this point, we can reconcile this finding with 
the theory only if we include elements of capital-market imperfections, such as a limited 
ability to borrow to finance accumulations of human capital. Other elements of an open 
economy-the mobility of labor and technology-tend to speed up the predicted rate of 
convergence. Therefore, we require even higher values of the capital-share parameter, a, to 
match the empirical results. 
Some recent models of endogenous economic growth, such as Rebelo (1990), assume 
constant returns to a broad concept of capital that includes human capital. This 
specification corresponds to a=l.0 in the neoclassical model. As mentioned, our empirical 
results indicate that the neoclassical model requires a value of a of about 0.8 to fit the 
observed speeds of convergence. The difference between a=0.8, where diminishing returns 
to capital set in slowly, and a=l.0, where diminishing returns set in not at all, may seem 
to be minor. But the difference amounts to a half life of 27 years in the former case versus 
infinity in the latter. To put it another way, the convergence coefficient /3=2% per year, 
corresponding to ~0.8, implies that the poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa should have 
experienced growth of real per capita GDP from 1960 to 1985 at an average rate above 6% 
per year, compared to 2% per year for the United States, if the African countries were 
approaching the same steady-state path as that for the United States. (The actual average 
growth rate of 0.8% per year for the sub-Saharan African countries is "explained" in the 
regression in Table 3, line 2, by the additional variables that proxy for steady-state 
positions.) The main point here is that a value for a of 0.8 is very far from 1.0 in an 
economic sense. 
In open-economy versions of the neoclassical growth model, it is possible to find 
convergence effects associated with technological diffusion even if the returns to capital are 
constant (a=l ). Even in closed-economy models with constant returns to a broad concept 
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of capital, convergence effects can reflect the working out of initial imbalances among the 
various kinds of capital. For example, Mullig_an and Sala-i-Martin (1991) show that the 
per capita growth rate is inversely related to initial physical capital per worker for a given 
initial quantity of human capital per worker. Thus, we would like to break down the 
observed convergence into various components: first, effects related to diminishing returns 
to capital and to imbalances among types of capital in the context of a closed economy; 
second, effects involving the mobility of capital and labor across economies; and third, 
effects that involve the gradual spread of technology. The present empirical results, which 
exploit only cross-sectional differences in growth rates, do not allow us to separate the 
observed convergence patterns into these components. We hope to make these distinctions 
in future research, which will also exploit the time-series variations of growth rates. 
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Appendix: Some Effects of Measurement Error 
The regressions shown in Tables 1 and 2 can exaggerate the estimated convergence 
A
coefficient, {3, if real income or product is measured with error. Aside from the usual 
measurement problems, one reason to expect errors is that we divide all nominal values in 
each year by a common price index. 
Equation (15) can be rewritten as 
(Al) (1/T)•log(y. t +T) = B + (e-/IT/T)•log(yi t) + u. t t +T
l, 0 ' 0 1' 0' 0 
Assume that the observed value at date t, log(yit), differs from the true value, log(yit), by 
a random measurement error: 
-
(A2) log(yit) = log(yit) + 1lit 
For purely temporary measurement error, 1lit would be white noise. Then, as is well 
known, the measurement error in log(y. t ) implied by equation (A2) leads to a bias
1, 0 
toward zero in least-squares estimation of the coefficient, e-/IT/T, in equation (Al). 
Because the term, e-/IT/T, in equation (A1) is decreasing in /3, the non-linear estimate P 
provides a corresponding overestimate of /3 in large samples. 
We can obtain a bound for the inconsistency induced by temporary measurement 
error. Equation (11) implies that the growth rate of income between any two future dates, 
t0+r and t0+T, is given by 
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where T>r>0 and ui,to+r,to+T depends on the error terms, uit' between dates t0+r and 
t0+T. Equation (A3) relates the growth rate from t0+r to t0+T to the level of per capita 
income or product at an earlier time, t0. Note that equation (15) is the special case in 
which r=O. 
We assume that the measurement error, T/· t , is independent of T/· t +t for t~r. This
1, 0 1, Q 
condition holds for all r>0 if T/it is white noise, but also applies for large enough r to 
measurement error with some persistence over time. We assume that T/· t is independent
1, Q 
of u. t + t +T· In this case, least-squares estimation of equation (A3) leads to an1, 0 r, 0 
underestimate of the magnitude of the coefficient, [(e-,Br-€-,BT)/(T-r)]. We can show 
that this term is increasing in ,B if ,B < [log(T/r)]/(T-r). In practice, we use the values 
r=IO years and T=20 years or r=5 years and T=IO years. For the first pair of values, the 
term, [(e-,Br-€-,BT)/(T-r)], is increasing in ,Bif ,8<0.07 per year; for the second pair, the 
term is increasing in ,B if ,8<0.14 per year. Therefore, for these ranges of ,Band in large 
samples, the underestimate of the coefficient on log(y. t ) in equation (A3) corresponds to 
1, Q 
a large-sample underestimate of ,B. Because this bias is opposite in direction to that found 
for equation (15), we can use regressions in the form of equation (A3) to bound the size of 
the bias. 
Consider the regressions for personal income in which each sub-period has individual 
coefficients for the constant, three regional dummies, and the sectoral-composition variable, 
sit' If we use only the five equal-length sub-periods from 1930-1940 to 1970-1980, then 
the joint estimate ,Bin the form of equation (15) is 0.0244 (0.0025), which is close to the 
value for nine sub-periods from 1880 to 1988 shown in Table 1, line 20. The comparable 
. 
result in the form of equation (A3) with r=IO years and T=20 years is ,B = 0.0278 (0.0049). 
Although we expected the asymptotic bias induced by temporary measurement error to be 
positive in the first case and negative in the second, the result for ,B turns out to be higher 
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in the second case. (The theoretical result can be affected by the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables in the regressions.) In any event, we infer from the similarity of the 
two estimates of f3 that temporary measurement error is unlikely to have a major influence 
on the results. 
For gross state product, we use the three equal-length sub-periods, 1970-1975, 
1975-1980, and 1980-1985. The joint estimate f3 in the form of equation (15) is 0.0280 
(0.0058), somewhat higher than that, 0.0216 (0.0042), shown for four sub-periods from 
1963 to 1986 in Table 2, line 11. Using r==5 years and T=l0 years, joint estimation of 
equation (A3) over the three sub-periods from 1970 to 1985 leads to the estimate, 
f3 = 0.0366 (0.0091). Again, contrary to expectations, the estimated value in the second 
case exceeds that in the first case. But the main inference is that the results are similar 
and, hence, that temporary measurement error is unlikely to be important. 
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Footnotes 
*We have benefited from research support by the National Science Foundation, the 
Bradley Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. We appreciate helpful comments from 
Gary Becker, Paul David, Steve Durlauf, Susan Guthrie, Carol Heim, Anne Krueger, 
Edward Lazear, Bob Lucas, Greg Mankiw, Kevin M. Murphy, Danny Quah, Sergio Rebelo, 
and Gavin Wright. 
1Sato (1966) presents a related analysis for a model with a constant gross saving rate. 
2The specification in equation (14) means that realizations of st effectively shift u~ in 
equations (12) and (13). Thus, the approach of u; to a steady-state value need no longer 
be monotonic. We plan in future research to analyze the time series of u; for the U.S. 
states. 
3We assume here that yit represents either real per capita income for residents of economy i 
( corresponding to the data on state personal income) or the real per capita income derived 
from production of goods and services in economy i ( corresponding to the figures on gross 
state product). Hence, changes in relative prices show up directly as changes in yit; for 
example, if no quantities change, then an increase in the relative price of oil generates a 
high growth rate of yit for economies that produce a lot of oil. 
4Some of these locational considerations apply also to labor income, although--except for a 
few cities-the location of a business and the residence of the workers are typically in the 
same state. 
5The error term is (1/T) times the sum for r between O and T of the error terms, u. t + ,
1, Q 7 
weighted by e-fi(T-r)_ 
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osee the appendix for a discussion of the effects of measurement error in yit on the estimates 
of fi. 
7The estimated f3 convergence across regions turns out to be similar to that within regions. 
See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a). 
Bit would be possible to restrict the constants if it were maintained that each state 
experienced exogenous technological progress at the constant rate x. We could then use 
the whole sample to estimate a single constant and the value of x. We have not imposed 
these restrictions because we have no reason to think that the rate of technological change 
would be the same over all time periods. 
9Easterlin (1960b, pp. 124 ff.) indicates that the data for 1840 do not cover income 
originating in wholesale and retail trade, finance-insurance-real estate, government, and 
most other services. The figures that we use for 1880 in the 1840-1880 regressions are 
comparable in coverage to those for 1840. This more limited coverage for 1880 comprises 
about half the income included in the measure that we used previously. In any event, the 
limited figures for 1840 are not comparable to the data for years after 1880. 
10This argument does not apply to the sub-period 1969-1975 (line 3 of Table 2). Although 
the oil price rose substantially over this period, the oil states did not have especially high 
values of per capita GSP in 1969. 
HThe results for personal income over the period 1980-1988 (Table 1, line 10) do not show 
the same pattern. The main difference is that the correlation in 1980 of the logarithm of 
per capita personal income with the share of income originating in oil and natural gas is 
close to zero. 
34 
12We exclude the four countries added after 1960 (Australia, Finland, Japan, and New 
Zealand) because of the possibility that the extension of membership was endogenous and 
related to the growth experience. 
13The data on educational attainment are from Statistical Abstract, various issues. We have 
not had much success in finding growth-rate effects related to cross-state differences in 








Comp. (sit) R2 (T 
1. 1880-1988 .0175 0.92 .0014
(.0046) 
2. 1880-1900 .0224 0.62 .0054
(.0040) 
3. 1900-1920 .0209 0.67 .0062
(. 0063) 
4. 1920-1930 - . 0122 0.43 .0111
(.0074) 
5. 1930-1940 .0127 0.36 .0075
(.0051) 
6. 1940-1950 .0373 0.86 .0057
(.0053) 
7. 1950-1960 .0202 0.49 .0048
(.0052) 
8. 1960-1970 .0135 0.68 .0037
(. 0043) 
9. 1970-1980 .0119 0.36 .0056
(.0069) 
10. 1980-1988 - .0005 0.51 .0103
(.0114) 
11. 9-period, .0189 -2-log(like. ratio)= 32.1P restricted (. 0019) (p-value = 0.000) 
12. 1880-1900 .0268 -0.0161 0.65 .0053
(. 0048) (0.0079) 
13. 1900-1920 .0269 -0.0214 0.71 .0060
(. 0075) (0.0094) 
14. 1920-1930 .0218 -0.0936 0.64 .0089
(.0112) (0.0175) 
15. 1930-1940 .0141 2.43 0.46 .0070
( .0048) (0.81) 
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Table 1, continued 
Sectoral 
Sample fJ Comp. (sit) R2 tr 
16. 1940-1950 .0362 -0.40 0.87 .0057
(.0055) (0.57) 
17. 1950-1960 .0313 0.42 0.65 .0041
(.0055) (0.09) 
18. 1960-1970 .0194 0.55 0.71 .0036
(.0052) (0.25) 
19. 1970-1980 .0139 0.25 0.36 .0056
(. 0076) (0.37) 
20. 1980-1988 .0196 1.35 0.73 .0077
(. 0106) (0.22) 
21. 9-period, .0249 indiv. -2-log(like. ratio)= 13.9
/J restricted ( .0021) (p-value = 0.084) 
22. 1840-1880 .0254 0.91 .0030
(. 0067) 
Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are shown in parentheses.
Regression 22 has 29 observations, regressions 1 and 2 have 47
observations (excluding Oklahoma), and regression 12 has 46 observations
(excluding Oklahoma and Wyoming). All others have 48 observations. The
dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita personal income
exclusive of transfers over the indicated sample period. Each regression
includes a constant and three regional dummy variables, south, midwest,
~est. (Regression 22 includes only south and midwest.) The coefficient
/J applies to log(y. t ), where y. t is real per capita personal income
1, 0 1, 0
at the start of the period. The sectoral-composition variable, sit' is
described in the text. The regressions denoted 9-period, /J restricted
use non-linear, iterative weighted least squares with the ~oefficient /J
constrained to be equal for all nine sub-periods. Individual
coefficients are estimated for each sub-period for the constant, regional
dummies, and the sectoral-composition variable. The likelihood-ratio
statistic refers to the hypothesis of equality for the /J coefficients.




Cross-State Regressions for Gross State Product 
Sectoral 
Sample /3 Comp. (sit) R2 (J 
1. 1963-1986 .0180 0.48 .0038
(.0059) 
2. 1963-1969 .0154 0.63 .0056
(.0060) 
3. 1969-1975 .0406 0.41 .0120
(.0162) 
4. 1975-1981 - .0285 0.17 .0139
(. 0130) 
5. 1981-1986 .1130 0.62 .0168
(.0244) 
6. 4-period, .0211 -2,log(like. ratio)= 31.2/3 restricted (.0053) (p-value = 0.000) 
7. 1963-1969 .0157 0.18 0.63 .0056
(.0060) (0.25) 
8. 1969-1975 .0297 1.56 0.74 .0081
(.0101) (0.20) 
9. 1975-1981 .0258 1. 74 0.78 .0072
(.0108) (0.15) 
10. 1981-1986 .0238 1. 73 0.92 .0079
(.0091) (0.13) 
11. 4-period, .0216 indiv. -2,log(like. ratio)= 1.7/3 restricted (.0042) (p-value = 0.637) 
12. 1963-1986 .0222 0.63 0.54 .0036
(.0065) (0.27) 
Notes: All regressions have 48 observations. The dependent variable isthe growth rate of real per capita gross state product (nominal GSP percapita divided by the national deflator for GSP). The regressionsdenoted 4-period, /3 restricted use non-linear, iterative weighted leastsquares with the· coefficient /3 constrained to be equal for the four sub­periods. Under the null hypothesis of equal coefficients, the
likelihood-ratio statistic is distributed as a x2 with 3 df. See alsothe notes to Table 1. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Regressions across Countries and U.S. States 
Additional
Sample fl Variables R2 (T 
1. 98 countries - .0037 no 0.04 .0183
1960-1985 ( .0018) 
II2. .0184 yes 0.52 .0133
(. 0045) 
3. 20 OECD Countries .0095 no 0.45 .0051
1960-1985 (. 0028) 
4. II .0203 yes 0.69 .0046
( .0068) 
5. 48 U.S. states .0218 no 0.38 .0040
1963-1986 (. 0053) 
II6. .0236 yes 0.61 .0033
(.0013) 
Notes: The dependent variable in regressions 1-4 is the growth rate of realper capita GDP from 1960 to 1985; in regressions 5 and 6 it is the growthrate of real per capita GSP (the variable used in Table 2) from 1963 to1986. The coefficient fl applies in regressions 1-4 to the logarithm of realper capita GDP in 1960; in regressions 5 and 6 to the logarithm of real percapita GSP in 1963. Each regression also includes a constant. The
additional variables included in regressions 2 and 4 are the primary andsecondary school-enrollment rates in 1960, the average ratio of governmentconsumption expenditure (standard figures less spending on· defense andeducation) to GDP from 1970 to 1985, the average number of revolutions andcoups per year from 1960 to 1985, the average number of political
assassinations per capita per year from 1960 to 1985, and the averagedeviation from unity of the Summers-Heston (1988) purchasing-power-parityratio for investment in 1960. See Barro (1991) for details on thesevariables. The additional explanatory variables included in regression 6are regional dummies, the sectoral-composition variable, sit' discussed in
the text, and the fraction of workers in 1960 that had accumulated someamount of college education. The 20 0ECD countries (the original membershipin 1960) are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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FIGURE 1: GROWTH RATE FROM 1880 TO 1988
VERSUS 1880 PER CAPITA INCOME 
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FIGURE 2: GROWTH RATE FROM 1840 TO 1880
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FIGURE 3: GROWTH RATE
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FROM 1963 TO 1986 
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FIGURE 4: GROWTH RATE FROM 1960 TO 1985
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FIGURE 5: GROWTH RATE FROM 1960 TO 1985 
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Key for Countries in Figures 4 and 5 
1. Algeria 36. Israel 71. Costa Rica 
2. Botswana 37. Japan 72. Dominican Republic
3. Burundi 38. Jordan 73. El Salvador 
4. Cameroon 39. Korea 74. Guatemala 
5. Central Afr. Repub. 40. Malaysia 75. Haiti 
6. Egypt 41. Nepal 76. Honduras 
7. Ethiopia 42. Pakistan 77. Jamaica 
8. Gabon 43. Phillipines 78. Mexico 
9. Ghana 44. Singapore 79. Nicaragua
10. Ivory Coast 45. Sri Lanka 80. Panama 
11. Kenya 46. Taiwan 81. Trinidad &Tobago
12. Liberia 47. Thailand 82. United States 
13. Madagascar 48. Austria 83. Aryentina
14. Malawi 49. Belgium 84. Bo ivia 
15. Mauritius 50. Cyprus 85. Brazil 
16. Morocco 51. Denmark 86. Chile 
17. Nigeria 52. Finland 87. Colombia 
18. Rwanda 53. France 88. Ecuador 
19. Senegal 54. Germany 89. Guyana
20. Sierra Leone 55. Greece 90. Paraguay 
21. South Africa 56. Iceland 91. Peru 
22. Sudan 57. Ireland 92. Uruguay
23. Swaziland 58. Italy 93. Venezuela 
24. Tanzania 59. Luxembourg 94. Australia 
25. Togo 60. Malta 95. Fiji 
26. Tunesia 61. Netherlands 96. New Zealand 
27. Uganda 62. Norway 97. Papua New Guinea 
28. Zaire 63. Portugal 98. Indonesia 
29. Zambia 64. Spain
30. Zimbabwe 65. Sweden 
31. Bangladesh 66. Switzerland 
32. Burma 67. Turkey
33. Hong Kong 68. United Kingdom
34. India 69. Barbados 
35. Iran 70. Canada 
